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Summary findings
The current and potential benefits  of the East-West  gas  would improve but the importer's welfare would
trade are enormous for all participants.  Realizing  those  detcriorate. The supplier and transitcer  would have
benefits requires significant  upfront investments.  But the  leeway to strategicaNy  raise their price and transit fee,
new, more complcx structure of thc gas transit system  respectively,  while gaining market share. But the
that has emerged following  changes in Eastern Europe  importer yould face rising costs for gas imports  and
and the former Soviet Union has created uncertainties  would lose welfare.
that bear on the expected benefits  from investrments.  - An increase  in the scope for the importer to
Grais  and Zheng argue for rhe existence of stable  substitute between alternative sources  of gas improves
contracts that would create an environment more  welfare for all three players.  The perception by the
conducive  to investments  and allow all participants to  supplier and transiter of increased  threat of competition
benefit from expansion of the gas trade.  Ieads to a preemptive  move not to lose market share. The
As a guidc to formulating  incentive-compatible,  transiter and supplier reduce the transit fee and supply
transparent, flexible  contracts, they propose a frampwork  price, respectively,  allcwing the importer to face a lower
based on a Stackelberg  game, with three players  (a  gas price. Import demand expands and welfare improves.
supplier, a transiter, and an importer) under Russia's  The expanded trade more than compensates for the
leadership.  They use this franework to analyze  the  reduction in the transit fee and supply price and allows
contract modifications  that would ensue from changes  larger payoffs for transiter and supplier.
affecting  the gas trade. They conclude that:  *  The perceprion of increased  reliability  of Russian
a  Increased  competitiveness  of the transiter and  gas supplies expands demand for Russian  gas and leads
supplier through cost reductions would improve  the  to the expansion of trade. The supplier and transiter can
payoffs  to all players (the transiter s and supplier's profits  raise their respective  charges  with expanded volume,
and the Westem importer's welfare). Strategic  behavior  improving  their payoffs.  The importer's welfare
on the part of the supplier and transiter would ultimately  deteriorates as the cost of importing gas rises
reduce the price to the importer, enlarging  gas demand  The predictability  of the players reactions to changes
and reducing  costs. If increased  competitiveness  is the  in the environment  would build confidence in the
outcome of more costly gas from sources  other than  reliability of gas trade and  allow its expansion,
Russia,  both the supplier's and the transiter's payoffs  benefiting  all participants.
This paper - a product of Europe and Central Asia,  Country Department IV, Country Operations Division 2-  is part
of a larger effort in the region to address the issues  in the energy sector raised by the collapse  of the fomer Soviet  Union
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The current and potential benefits of the East West gas trade are enormous for all participants.
The realization of these benefits require significant  upfront investments. The  new, and  more
complex,  structure of the gas transit system that has  emerged  following the changes in Eastern
Europe and the Former Soviet Union has created uncertainties however that bear on the expected
benefits of the investments. This paper argues for the existence of stable contracts that would create
an environment more conducive to the investments and allow all participants to benefit from the
expansion of the gas trade.  A framework based on a Stackelberg game with three players (a supplier,
a transiter and an importer) under Russia's leadership is proposed as a guide to the formulation of
incentive compatible, transparent and flexible contracts.  The framework is used to analyze the
contract modifications that would ensuie  from changes in the environment bearing on the gas trade.
Three main conclusions can be drawn.
An increased competitiveness of the transiter and supplier through cost reductions woulF
improve the pay-offs of all players in the game.  The transiter's and supplier's profits as well as the
western importer's welfare would improve.  Basically it would induce a strategic behavior on the part
of the supplier and transiter that would lead to a decline in the price faced by the importer, enlarging
gas demand and reducing costs.  If the increased competitiveness is the outcome of more costly gas
from other sources than Russia, both the supplier's and transiter's pay-offs would improve but the
importer's welfare would deteriorate.  The supplier and transiter would have leeway to strategically
raise their price and transit fee respectively while gaining market share.  The importer however
would face rising costs of gas imports and lose welfare.
An increase in the scope of substitution for the importer between gas from alternative sources
improves on welfare of all three players. The perception on the part of the supplier and transiter of an
enhanced threat of competition leads to a preemptive move to not lose market share.  The transiter
and supplier reduce the transit fee and supply price respectively allowing the importer to face a lower
gas price.  The latter's import demand expands and welfare improves.  The expanded trade more than
compensates for the reduction in the transit fee and supply price and allows for larger pay-offs for the
transiter and supplier.
The perception of increased reliability of supplies of gas from Russia shifts outward the
demand for gas from Russia and leads to the expansion of trade.  The supplier and transiter have
scope to raise their respective charges with expanded volumes improving their pay-offs.  The
importer's welfare deteriorates as the cost of importing gas rises.
The predictability of the players' reactions to changes in the environment would build
confidence in the reliability of gas trade and allow its expansion benefitting all participants.  The
game proposed in the paper provides a framework for analyzing  the strategic moves of the prayers
and gaining insights on their predictability.STRATEGIC INTERDEPENDENCE  IN THE EAST-WEST GAS TRADE
--  A Hierarchical Stackelberg Game Approach
Wafik Grais and Kangbin Zheng
I.  Introduction:  The Need for Stable Contracts
In  1992 Russia  exported  to  Western  and flexible contract rules can be analyzed.  In
Europe about 60 billion cubic meters (bcm) of  light of the emerging  strucure  of  the market,
gas at a value of $9 billion.  Russia, the Western  it  identifies  participants  and  looks  at  their
marketers  (mainly  Ruhrgas),  and  the  transit  sharing of rents as a non-cooperative non-zero-
countries  received  43%,  47%  and  10%  sum game.
respectively of the value of the gas delivered.
Ukraine's  and the then Czechoslovak's shares  Section II below briefly describes the
amounted to $100 and $730 million respectively.  structure of the market as it is emerging post the
For foreign exchange strapped Russia and transit  collapse of the FSU.  Section m then delineates
countries, gas  exports are a critical source of  the interdependence  and interactions in the East-
revenue. They are also essential for the western  West gas trade as a Stackelberg  non-cooperative
European countries that rely for 25% of their  game with Russia as the leader, and discusses
gas consumption  on Russian sources. The stakes  the equilibrium outcome of the game in general.
are  even  much  larger  if  one  looks  at  the  Section  IV  develops a  numerical  application
potential expansion of  that trade.  Europe  is  assuming a  social  welfare  function for the
likely to  increase its  reliance on gas,  notably  western gas importer of the  nested constant-
because of environmental  concerns, while Russia  elasticity-of-substitution  (CES)  type,  under
could  generate  and  deliver  large  additional  transparent  assumptions  and  conditions
supplies 1. prevailing  around  1993.  It  analyzes  how
exogenous changes  modiy the outcome, offermg
Given the up front costs involved,  to  an miustration  of the transparency and flexibiliy
develop the East-West gas market and provide  of  the  rules.  Conclusions  and  policy
participants with the associated  benefits, stability  implications follow.  The detailed mathematical
of contracts will be essential.  That will require  structure of the game and the calibration of the
a  perception of  fairness  on  the  part  of  all  initial conditions are presented in the Annex.
involved. as well as transparency and flexibility
of the rules.  Some of these features partially
characterized gas trade while the Soviet Union
existed.  However the  disintegration of  the
latter, the  "velvet divorce" of the Czech and
Slovak republics, and the transition to private
market economies of  the countries of central
Europe and the former Soviet  Union (FSU)  have
created  new  conditions  and  expressions  of
specific country interests that call into question
previous arrangemnents.
This paper develops a framework within
which fair, i.e. incentive  compatible, transparent
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I.  The Changing Structure of the East-West Gas Trade
The gas pipelines transit system  channels  transiters, forming  partnerships  with distributors,
Russian gas from Siberian fields northeast of  and gaining new clients to strengthen demand 3.
Moscow  trough  Ukraine,  Slovakia and  the  Finally western consumers, balancing costs and
Czech Republic to Germany. Some gas transits  security of supplies, arc considering alternative
through  Belarus, while Austria and Italy also  sources ranging from  Nortl  African, Middle
receive deliveries.  Eastern to Norwegian gas.
-Before the collapse of the Eastern Bloc,  The terms of the East-West gas trade
a stable market relationship existed between a  have become more complex.  More participants
monopoly. supplier,  Gazprom  of  the  Soviet  are now involved.  Each has the potential for
Union,  and a  monopsony buyer,  Ruhrgas of  disrupting supplies if it perceives unfairness and
Germany.  Gazprom sold the gas at an agreed  possible additional gains.  Incentive compatible,
upon  price  at  the  western  border  of  then  transparent and flexible rules that can survive
Czechoslovakia  and paid fees to local gas transit  are needed even more now than previously.
companies  in  Belarus,  Ukraine  - and
Czechoslovakia. Ruhrgas distributed the gas to
industrial users and consumers in Germany.
Since  1989 Czechoslovakia split from
toe  Eastern Bloc and  then went  through the
"velvet  divorce"  between  its  two  constituting
components the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Meanwhile the dissolution of the Soviet Union
allowed  Belarus  and  Ukraine  to  emerge  as
independent states.  Each of these new actors
gained a monopolistic control on the portion of
gas pipeline running through its territory.
These historical events put into question
the stable monopolist-monopsonist  relationship
that existed previously.  The transit countries,
also  dependent  on  Russia  for  their  energy
resources, sought to improve their situation by
claiming a higher fee for the transit services  they
provide 2. Meanwhile Gazprom is developing a
new commercial and development strategy to
maintain its dominant role in the transit system
and the benefits associated with it. This strategy
could-include  pursuing equity participation  in the
transit  companies of  other countries to  exert
some control on them, promoting construction  of
new pipeline routes to break the monopolies of
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Ill.  A Game Theoretical Approach to the East-West Gas Trade
The following  describes  the East-West  concerns  of transit countries  is the transit fee,
gas trade as  a  three-player, non-cocperative  denoted  by T in local currency,  to be charged.
repeatable  game with information  asymmetry  Finally  the importer's essential  decision is the
and behavioral coordination.  The economic  anount G of gas to buy from  Russia. Assuming
rationale  for these assumptions  are discussed  eR  and eD  to be the exchange  rates between  the
below and lead into the forumlation  of a set of  Russian  ruble and the transiter's local currency
relationships  whose  solutions  are  the transit  fee,  and  between the  latter  and  the  importer's
the price of gas charged by Russia, and the  currency respectively, the  three  identified
amount  of demand  for gas by the importer.  decision  variables are linked in the following
way
A.  Players  eDPG-T+CRPR  (1)
The current  East-West  gas trade can be
modeled as  a  game among three players: a  where P 0 is the gas price the importer  would
supplier  (Russia),  a transiter  (Belarus,  Ukraine,  pay in local currency, and this price wo:ld
Slovakia and  the  Czech Republic) and  a  directy affect  the demand  G.  Alternatively  the
consumer  (Western  Europe). This grouping  of  foregoing  relationship  entails:
participants  reflects  the common  characteristics
of interests  within each group and captures  the  PC = P  t  PR,  T,  e,  eR),  (2)
essential  interdependence  within the gas trade
chain 4. reflecting  the direct dependence  of the local
price paid by  the  Western importer on  the
In  a  longer time  perspective, more  Russian  supply  price, PR,  the transit  fee, T, and
participants  are likely to  be involved in this  the relevant  exchange  rates. It Is not  difficult  to
trade.  Turkmenistan  and Kazkhstan,  Norway,  verify tht5  PG will rise if  Russia raises its
Middle  East  or African  countries  may  contribute  export price, the transiter increases  its transit
to supplies  in competition  with Russia. Poland  fee, or the importer's  currency  appreciates.
is a major  potential  competitor  to current  transit
countries.  More Western European  countries  For simplicity,  theforegoingformulation
may  want to have  direct access  to Russian  gas.  assumes that each of  the  three participants
In addition  increased  private participation  may  concentrates  on one major decision  variable,  or
add  new transit  and distributor companies.  alternatively each one  has a one-dimensional
These developments  would  increase  the number  strategy  space. In fact, every  player's strategy
of participants  in each of the three identified  space can be multi-dimensional,  and each is
groups  of  players.  Eventually a  more  likely  to be able to influence  a number  factors.
competitive  market  could emerge.  Russia  could decide inter alia on the price and
volume of the gas supplied for the domestic
B.  Decision  Variable  of Each Player  consumption  of  the  transiter, the price and
volume of oil deliveries,  electricity  exchanges
One of Russia's major decisions  is the  and their tariffs, apart from the price to be
price it would  charge  for the gas it exports,  say  charged  to the final  Western  importer. Besides
PR in  rubles.  Similarly one of  the  main  the transit fee, thc adnsiter has discretion  over
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the amount of storage it can offer, and the level  parameters A would include the perception of
and quality of services it provides.  Finally apart  the reliability of supplies, among other factors
from the volume of gas it imports from Russia,  not specifically spelt out here.
the importer would be deciding simultaneously
on gas imports from other sources as well as on  The transiter's  pay-off is the profit  it
the  use  of  alternative kinds of  energy.  The  draws  from  the gas transit.  lThis is defined
multi-dimensionality  of each player's choices is  assuming that the transiter is aware of the unit
very important in reality, and is a direction for  gas transit cost S, the fixed pipeline cost Fl, the
further  research.  price P, Russia charges, the behavior 'rule" of
the Western importer (4), and the relationship
C.  The Players' Pay-off Functions  (2) between prices and the transit fee.  The  Xy
off function of the transiter is then:
Each player's objective in the game is to
choose its best strategy to maximize its payoff.  l(PR 7)  =(T-S)G[PG(PR,  flJ-Fr  (5)
The Western imDorter's  pay-off  function  is the
welfare  associated: with  the  volume  of  gas
imported  from  Russia.  Abstracting  from  For any given Russian supply price P.,
institutional complexities and from the details of  the transiter selects  the transit fee Tto maximize
how gas contributes to welfare, one can assume  its profit.  The transiter  is here a Stackelberg
a utility function', depending on the quantity G,  follower as its behavior is a reaction rule to the
a vector of quantities of other goods consumed  price signal set by Russia as the leader.  The
Z, including gas and energy imported from other  maximization  will lead the transiter to set the fee
sources, and a vector of parameters A:  at the point where the marginal revenue of an
U=U(G  A  (3)  increase  in  the  transit  fee  is  equal  to  the
U  =  U (  G  ,Z,A  )  3  marginal cost!.  The outcome will be a transit
fee T that depends on the Russian supply price,
Based on the above utility finction,  the  P,,  the unit transit cost S, the relevant exchange
information  on the prices charged for the various  rates, and the market import demand for Russian
goods,  including P,  the  price  index  of  the  gas in western Europe:
composite  good  Z,  and  the  available  total
expenditure Y, the Western importer's demand  T = T(Pr  S, F7  eD, e,  P,  Y,A)  (6)
for  Russian  gas  would  result  from  utility
maximization as
The Russian gas supplier is assumed to
G  = G ( PG'  P,  YA)  A  (4)  have full knowledge  of the transiter's reaction
function (6), of the Western importer's behavior
(4) and of the relationship between the relevant
Naturally  utility  maximization would  prices (2).  With C denoting the known unit cost
result  in  a  parallel  demand equation for  the  for gas production and F.  the fixed cost, the
composite good Z.Under normal assumptions  an  Russian  gas suRplier's  ply-ff  function  is:
increase in  P6 would drive  down  G,  and  a
decline in the price of energy from alternative
sources, captured by a decrease of  Pz, would
shift the demand curve outward.  TMe  vector of
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developments render  Russia  desperate  for
-I'(PR)  a  (PR  - CW[EPc/Pa)]  -FR,s  (7)  foreign  exchange,  its leadership  role may come
into question  and the framework  proposed  here
where  the argument  T in P.(.) has been  replaced  would  need  to be modified.
by the expression  in (6) reflecting  the transiter's
behavior.  The gas supplier will select PR to  The  framework  considered in  the
maximize  its profit as presented  in (7).  The  foregoing  assumes  an  asymmetry in  the
price chosen will be the  one at  which the  avail;bility of information  to the players. In
marginal  revenue  and cost of an increase  in PA  order  to proceed  with  its decision-making  on P,
are equal, the marginal  cost being the revenue  the Russian supplier  needs  to have access to
foregone ty  the ensuing  decline in demand.  information  on  other  players'  decision
The profit  maximization  will result  in a price  PR  parameters  (e.g.,  factors  affecting  demand in
such as:  European  markets,  Y,  A, P,, i.e. the parameters
entering the  other  players'  decision rules).
P.jPpjCgFRS,FpP4iY,ereA)  (8)  However the transiter needs ony  to observe the
determinasts  of the Western  importer's demand
while  the latter decides  on the basis of only the
price signal PG and information  on his own
D.  Interactions between Players  environment. The  assumption on  information
asymmetry  reflects  the reluctance  of Gazprom  to
Russia  is assumed  to have  a leadership  allow foreign  equity participation  in either gas
role in the supply  of gas to Western  markets. It  production  or transit companies  and its active
is the largest supplier  that can satisfy  Western  efforts  to get involved  in downstream  activities.
Europe's demand at an economic  cost in the
short to medium  term. This position  gives  it an
influential  role in the determination  of the price  Before 1990, the  transiters and  the
it can charge. The above framework  captures  suppliers  formed  a  coalition.  Then
Russia's leadership role in the fact that the  Czechoslovakia,  Ukraine, Belarus and Russia
critical  decision that  deternines  the  game  shared information,  production  resources and
outcome  is  the  Russian  gas  supplier's  revenues  in cooperation. The configuration  of
determination of  the  price P.  Once that  the transit system  that emerged  after 1991  has
decision is made,  the other players  in the chain  not allowed  the pursuit of previous  cooperation
will use  their decision  rule to react.  The transiter  and is making attempts at reviving difficult.
and the Western importer will determine  the  This feature is captured  in the non-cooperative
transit fee  T  and the  demand of  gas  G,  nature  of the game framework  proposed  in the
respectively.  The  further  assumption of  above9.
behavioral  coordination  is  based  on  the
presumption that no  player is  expected to  Finally  the  decisions made  can  be
challenge  the leadership  role of the Russian  undone and adjusted  in response  to changes  in
supplier  in the short to medium  term (entailing  the environment  of each participant. There is
that this hierarchical  decision  structure  is likely  always  the possibility  of recontracting  within  the
to last for a while)  and the players' acceptability  same framework which gives the  game its
of the sequential  nature  of the decision-making  repeatable  feature.
procedure  in  the  chain.  However,  if
5Grais  & Zbeng  Strategic  Interdependence  in the East-West  Ga9  Trde
E.  A Summary  Presentation  of the Game
The behaviors  outlined  in the foregoing
lead to  two sets of equations.  The first  is
composed of  three  relations that  together
determine  the  core  variables  namely  the
supplier's  price  PR. the  transit fee  T and the
importer's demand for gas G.  These three
equations (8),  (6)  and  (4) respectively are
gathered in  the top  panel of Table- 1,  and
followed  by relation  (2) that link the price  faced
by the importer  to that charged  by the supplier
and to  the  transit fee.  The second set  of
equations  are presented  in the lower panel of
Tablel1.  They permit the computation  of the
total rent accruing  to both the transiter  and the
supplier  and  their respective  shares,  the  profit of
each of them, and the welfare index of the
importer. This second  set of variables  can be
derived  once  the  three core  ones  are  determined.
The recursivity of the set of the three
core equations in  the top panel of Table  I
reflects the  Stackeliberg  leadership of  the
supplier.  Equation (8) allows the supplier to
determine his  price  on  the  basis  of  his
information  on costs, market  conditions  and the
other players' reaction functions.  Once the
supplier sets a  price PR,,  then the  transiter
through  equation  (6) determines  the  transit  fee T.
Finally  the importer  can decide  on the level of
gas imports  from Russia  G.
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Table  1
The System of Equations of Strategic Interdependence among Players
Supplier's Price  PR  PR  P,(C,  FR, S. F7, Pz, Y, en, eR A)
Transit Fen  T  T  m  T(PR! S, Fp  el,, ep  Pz  Y, A)
Demand for Russian Gas  G  G  =  G(PG, Pz,  Y, A)
Importer's Price  PC  T  +  eRPR
l  7  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~Z3  Z(P,;,  Pz,  Y,  A) 
Demand  for  Other  Goods  Z
Importer's Welfare Index  U  U  =  U(G, Z, A)
Unit  Rent  R  R  =  cDPG - S  - eCC
Russia's  Profit  -iR  HR  - (  C)G  - FR
Transiter's Profit  [  Hr  =  (T-S)G  - Fr
T
Revenue  (OF  TP  +  =  RPE
T-S
Transiter's  Unit Rent  _T  + eRPZ  - S  - e,C
Share in
Mr
Total Profit  _  0 =  eT  _
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IV.  Contract  Modifications in Response to Exogenous Changes
In the following, we analyze how the  or the price behavior of competitors,  and iii)
game regains its  equilibrium solution and the  increased competition in the gas market.
players  change  their  strategy  selections,  in
response to external shocks.  These comparative  An increase of the expenditure on gas
statics  analyses show  that  gas trade  contracts  (AY  >0)  relaxes  the  importer's  budget
with incentive compatibility as presented in our  constraint, and thus contributes to the expansion
game solutions possess sufficient flexibility to be  of demand for gas from all sources, as a direct
modified  to  reflect  changes  in  the  trade  result  of  the  income  effect  in  welfare
environment.  Each  player  will  act  on  its  maxiuization  (fables  3  and  4,  collum  4).
decision variable, that is the three core variables  Strategic  intractions  in  the  competitive gas
PR,  T,  and  G.  depending  on  the  strategic  market force the supplier and the transiter not to
interactions  specified  in  the  game.  The  raise  their  supply  price  and  transit  fee,
assumption on the behavior of the importer as  respectively, in respond to a growing demand.
reflected  by  the  specification of  the  welfare  Indeed any increase in the price of Russian gas
function plays a critical role in determining the  charged to the importer would induce alternative
outcome of the game.  Here we ass-me a nested  suppliers  to  capture  a  larger  share  of  the
CES  type  welfare index' 0,  which provides  a  increased  demand,  compress  Russia's  market
reasonable  first  approach while  allowing for  share, and limit the improvemen in pay-offs to
ease of calibration.  Table 2 presents the set of  both the transiter  and supplier below the one
equations of the game with the assumption of a  which could be obtained under a no-price-change
CES  welfare  index,  while  Tables  3  and  4  strategy
identify the signs of the partial derivatives and
the  elasticities  of  endogenous  variables  Consequendy, all three players benefit
respectively in the neighborhood of the initial  from  the  stronger  purchasing  power  of  the
equilibriumw,  as calibrated on  1992 figures (see  importer and the enlarged volume of gas trade.
Annex).  We  first  consider  changes  in  the  Due  to  the  homogeneity  of  degree  one
importer's  environment  and  then  in  the  assumption  of  the  welfare  function,  a  one
transiter's  and producer's-  In each case,  we  percent  increase in  Y leads to  a  one percent
look at  modifications of  the players'  strategy  expansion of gas demand G, and improves the
choice, the payoffs, and the distribution of trade  importer's  welfare index by one percent.  The
gains.  transiter's  and supplier's  pay-offs improve by
more  than  one  percent  each,  because of  the
A.  Clanggs intleTImporter's  Envir  ent  presence of fied  costs in their pay-ffst .
The importer's decision environment  can  Finally, it is noticeable that, though its
be affected by:  i) an increased expenditure on  profit  rises,  the transiter's  share  in  the  total
gas as can result from a general expansion  of the  profit becomes marginally lower,  reflecting its
western  economy  or  inter-fuel  substitution  lower  fixed  costs.  However,  the  rent  and
between  oil  and  gas  aue  to  stronger  revenue share of the transiter do not change as
environmental concerns; ii) a shift in the western  they  depend  only  on  prices  which  remain
demand schedule of Russian gas either due for  unchanged when the importer's  expenditure on
example to a changed perception of its reliability  gas increases.
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Table 2
Strategic Interdepundence with a Nested CES Welfare Function for the Inporter
Supplier's Price  pit  S+eRPR  7 PR)-S  T(PR)  +eRC  7  1EPR)+eRPR  71PR)+eRPE
S. pplier's P-ice  R PR  C  T(PR)+eRPRR  OaVRPR  + SI  a  TPR)  -
Transit  ree  T  T-S  =  [a(T+e[r  RP)I  I
eRPR + S  -1
Demand for  G  -G=  D  [  (T+eRPpl  \ 
Russian  Gas  G  T+e=  (1,  e 13P 0
mporer's  Price  PC.  eD  (T  P  e4tPR)
Damand for
'Oter'  Gas  0  O  -F(Y-PGG)
Importers  U  U=.CE5[G,O,a,o.=(a  G  0+(I-a)O
Welfare Index  [
Unit Rent  R  R  = eDPG  - S  - eRC
Russia's Profit  if'  = (PR - C)G  FR
Transiter's Profit  _fr  I  = (T-S)G  - FT
T
Revenue  ~~~~~~T+  eRPR
Sham of  R  "3R  T+  eP-  S -eRC
Transiter  -
FH+  eRlIt
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An outward shift in the demand  schedule  4, col. 5.). The increase in a will result in the
for Russian gas  can result, for instance, from a  perception  by both the supplier and the transiter
perception  of increased  supply reliability, which  of a weakening of their negotiation power and
leads to  an  exogenous increase  in  Russia's  lead to a reduction of the supply price P,  and
market share (Ao>O) (Tables 3 and 4, col. 6),  the transit fee T, to attain their maximal  profits.
or from a rising price of competitors (AP 0>O)  The importer now faces a lower price P.  and
(Tables 3 and 4, col. 7).  These developments  demands more Russian gas.  Gas from other
will reduce, relatively, the competitiveness of  sources is crowded out, but not as much as the
non-Russian gas suppliers, and strengthen the  incremental  Russian gas supply.
negotiating  power of the transiter and supplier.
Therefore, they are provided with some leeway  One of the most important  messages  here
to increase  their fee and price respectively,  while  is that stronger market competition benefits all
continuing to benefit from a larger volume of  agents  in the market. The overall East-West  gas
trade.  The importer has to rely more on the gas  trade  expands.  The  average  import  cost
from Russia.  For a given expenditure on gas  declines.  All three players harvest larger pay-
imports, demand for gas from other sources is  offs.  The importer consumes more gas thanks
compressed  to the extent more than the increased  to  that  competition beats down prices.  The
demand for Russian gas (i.e. &O+AG<0).  The  transiter's  and supplier's profits also improve,
average import cost is raised. Accordingly, the  because the expansion in gas trade (+ 1.32) is
total consumption  of gas declines.  relatively more important than the decline in the
unit rent (-.63).
As a result, Russia's and the transiter's
pay-offs are improved, while the welfare index  Nevertheless, the transiter's bargaining
of  the  importer is  worsened.  Naurally  the  power shrinks more than that of the supplier,
revenue, rent and profits  of the supplier and  when the western European gas market becomes
transiter  expand.  more  competitive,  due mainly  to  its position  in
this  chain  game  as  a  Stackelberg follower.
The distribution pattern of the trade gain  Hence, its shares in revenues, rents and profits
changes mainly in response to the variations of  deteriorate,  leaving  relatively  more  to  the
the revenue-cost  ratios.  Because  the percentage  supplier. The larger decline in the transit fee (-
increase in transit fee is larger than that in the  .66) than in the supplier's price  (-0.1) drives
supplier's price, the transiter's share in revenue  down  the  transiter's  share  in  revenues.
improves. However, both the supplier's variable  Similarly, the transiter gets a smaller share in
and  fixed costs  are larger than those  of the  thetotalrent(downby-.25)andthetotalprofit
transiter.  Therefore, the unit rent and profit of  (down  by -.32).
the  supplier expand more than  those of  the
transiter,  whose  shares  in  them  deteriorate
slightly.
The gas market in Western Europe may
become mnore  competitive. One reason, among
others,  can  be  a  rise  in  the  scope  of
substitutability for  the  importer between gas
from alternative sources (Aor>0) (rables 3 and
10Table  3
Directions of Variations of Endogenous  Variables with Respect to  Fluctuations of Exogenous  Variables
(In the Neighborhood of the Initial Equilibrium Outcome)
Exchange  Rates
Endogenous  Variables  Importer's  Parameters  in Transiter's  Gas Transit  Gas  Supply
and Parameters  _  _  _  Currency  Cost  Cost
Expendi-  Substitu-  Russia'  Price  of  DM  Rbl  Unit  Fixed  Unit  Fixed
Variables  ture on  tion  Market  "Other"  (eD)  (eR)  (S)  (FT)  (C)  (FR)
Variables  ~~~~~~Foreign  Gas  Elasticity  Share  Gas
l  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~Y  o  p  ____
Supplier's  Price  PR  0  +  +  +  - _  0  +  0
Transit  Fee  T  0  +  +  +  =  +  0  =  0
Demand for Russian Gas  G  I  +  +  +  +  0  - 0
Importer's  Price  PG  0  +  +  +  +  0  +  0
Demand for "Other" Gas  0  I  - _  +  +  0  +  0
Importer's Welfare Index  U  I  +  _  +  _0  0
Unit Rent  R  0  +  ±  +  _  0  0
Russia's Profit  nf  - +  +  +  +  +  0
Transiter's Profit  flT+  +  +  +  +  - . O
Revenue  xp  0  +  +  +  +  0  0
Transiter's-- 
- -
:TSahnare  eirnS  Unit Rent  z  0  +  +  0  +  0
Total  Profilt  u  I  - +  +  . +  +Grais & Zheng  Strategic Interdependence  in the East-West  Gas Trade
B.  Changes  In  the  Environment  of  the  significantly less than the increase in the unit
Transiter and SuoDlier  rent measured in the transiter's  local currency
(by 1.41).
In  the determination of their  strategic
moves, the transiter and supplier are affected by  The  depreciation  of  the  transiter's
changes in their costs.  The current framework  currency vis a vis that of the supplier reduces
allows us to analyze the effects of the following  the competitiveness of Russian gas on Western
elements  of  costs:  i)  depreciations  in  the  markets and worsens the pay-offs of the three
exchange rates of the transiter vis a vis both the  players. Assuming the transiter buys the gas at
importer's and supplier's currencies; ii) changes  the Rassian border and resells it at its Western
in  the  variable  and  fixed  costs  of  both  the  border, the cost of the main input has increased,
traniiter and the supplier.  putting upward  pressure  on  the price  to  the
Western  importer.  Were  the  one  percent
The  depreciations"  of  the  transiter's  depreciation  to  be  passed  through  to  the
currency vis a vis that of the western importer  importer, the price P0 would also increase by as
and the supplier have opposite effects. In the  much.  That would entail a significant switch
first  case,  the  depreciation  increases  the  away from Russian  gas and loss of welfare. The
competitiveness of the cransiter's activity and  supplier  and  transiter  contain  that  effect  by
improves the pay-offs of all participants. A one  reducing both  the transit  fee  and  the  supply
percent devaluation reduces  by half a percentage  pnce, limiting the final increase in the importer
point the price paid by the  importer in  local  price to less than half a percentage point, and
currency.  Had  there  not  been  a  strategic  the loss of market share.  The average import
response by the supplier and transiter to increase  cost increases, while the importer consumes less
their charges, the importer would have faced a  foreign gas.
price lower by also a one percentage point.  But
the devaluation provides leeway for  both  the  With a larger marginal profit, Russia is
transiter and supplier to raise their charges while  affected more negatively than the transiter by a
still leaving  the Russian gas more competitive  on  shrinking  of  the  trade  volume.  Hence,  the
the importer's market  As a result of the lower  Russia's  profit declines (by -5.15) more than
price Raid  and the ensuing expansion  of denand,  that  of the transiter  (by 3.00),  resulting in  a
the importer's welfare improves. The expansion  relative improvement  for the transiter's share in
of demand, together with the larger transit fee  the total profit.  Meanwhile, the transit fee is
and supplier's price, contributes to the improved  pressed less (by -0.09) than the unit share (by -
pay-offs of both.  The relative position of the  0.36), leading the transiter gains a larger share
transiter-  improves  in  terms  of  revenue  in the unit rent, though its marginal transit profit
collection, since the transit fee rises (by 0-86)  shrinks. However, since the transiter's currency
more than the Russian supply price (by 0.40).  becomes  less  valuable  against  that  of  the
However, its shares in the total profit declines,  suppliers,  its  share in  the total sales  revenue
mainly because Russia enlarges its  profit (by  declines.
5.71) more than the transiter (by 4.48),  taking
advantage of  its  larger  marginal  profit  and
bigger  fixed  cost.  Similarly,  the  transiter's
share in the unit rent also deteriorates,  becaue
the  increase  in  the  transit  fee  (by  0.86  is
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An increase in the variable cost of ffie  contained by the supplier's price behavior.  The
supolier  or  the  transiter  also  reduces  the  importer  still  pays  a  higher  price  however,
competitiveness  of  Russian  gas  on  Western  switches  away  from  Russian gas  and  sees  a
markets and worsens the pay-offs of all three  deterioration in welfare.  Both the supplier and
players.  transiter  have  also  reduced  pay-offs.  The
transiter's  share  in  revenue  improves as  the
An  increase in the supplier's  variable  transit fee increases while the supplier's  price
cost affects negatively the pay-offs of all three  declines.  The gains in rent and profits share are
players but improves  the position of the transiter  minor also.
relatively to that of the supplier. The rise in the
variable cost of the supplier reduces its rent and  The supplier  and  the transiter  absorb
throws  itself  off  the  profit  maximization  increases in their own fixed costs and experience
equilibrium.  In seeking a new one, the supplier  a  deterioration  in  their  own profits.  Their
raises the price to the point where the marginal  respective shares in aggregate profits  respond
revenue  is  equal  to  the  marginal  cost  correspondingly. A variation in fixed costs does
incorporating into this  decision, because of its  not  affect  marginal  revenue  or  cost  at  the
leadership position, the expected  reactions of the  prevailing prices;  it does not lead hence to  a
importer and the transiter.  The importer reduces  modification  of  the  volume  of  trade  and
demand in response to the price increase and  consequently  of  the  existing  equilibrium  in
hence  the  transiter's  marginal  revenue.  In  strategy selections.
response the transiter reduces its transit fee.  A
one percent increase in the supplier's  variable
cost leads to  a contraction of gas demand by
more than 2-5 percent  and an increase in the
importer's  price  by  almost half a  percentage
point.  The latter's  welfare index deteriorates.
The  supplier's  pay-off contracts by almost 4
percent in spite of the marginal gain of slightly
more than half a percentage point in the price
charged.  The contraction of the volume of gas
traded pulls down also the transiter's profit by 3
percent, almost a percentage point less than that
of the supplier. As a result of a rising supplier's
price and  a  failing transit fee,  the transiter's
share in the total revenue declines. However, its
share  in  the  unit  rent  and  the  total  profit
improve.
A one percent increase in the unit transit
cost will lead to an increase in the transit fee by
about a quarter of one percentage point to the
point where the marginal revenue is again set to
be  equal to  the  marginal cost.  The  ensuing
upward  pressure  on  the  importer's  price  is
13Table 4
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS IN  TIlE EQUILIBRIUM NElGIIBORIIOOD
Witlh  a Nested  CES  Welfare  Function  for the Imiporter
Exchange Rates
Importer's  Parameters  in Transiter's  Gas  Transil  Gas Supply Cost
Elasticities  of the  Endogenous  . Currency  Cost
Variables  with respect to  Initial
I% change in  Values  Expendi-  Substilu-  Russia's  Price of
the Exogenous  Variables  ture on  lion  Mfarket  "Other"  DhI  Rbl  Unit  Fixed  Unit  Fixcd
Foreign  Elasticity  Share  Gas  (en)  (er)  (S)  (FT)  (C)  (FR)
._______________________  ._________  G  as (Y)  (°)  (a)  (PO)
Benchmark Value  $20.6 bn  7.25  25.0%  $86/tcm  1.0  1.0  $5/tcm  S100n  $SSO/lcm  S2OOm
m  - _.  -
Supplier's  Price  Pft  $65.9/tem  0.00  .0.10  +0,08  +0.40  +0.40  -0.38  -0.01  0.00  +0.62  0.00
Transit  Fee  T  $20.1  /tem  0.00  -0.66  +0.18  +0.86  +0.86  -0.09  +0.24  0.00  -. 09  0.00
Demand  for Russian  Gas  G  60 bcm  +1.00  + 1.32  +0.39  +1.79  +2.81  -2.55  -0.26  0.00  -2.55  0.00
Importer's  Price  P.  $86.0/tcrn  0.00  -0.23  +0.11  +0.51  -0.49  +0.45  +0.05  0.00  +0.45  0.00
Demand  for 'Other'  Gas  0  180  bcm  +1.00  -0.36  -0.16  -1.75  -0.77  +0.70  +0.07  0.00  +0.70  0.00
Importer's Welfare  Index  U  100.0  +1.00  +0.06  -0.03  -0.87  +0.12  -0.11  -0.01  0.00  -0.11  0.00
Unit  Rent  R  $3  1.0/tem  0.00  -0.63  +0.30  +1.41  +1.41  -0.36  -0.04  0.00  -0.36  0.00
Russia's  Profit  lilt  + 1.27  +1.15  +0.93  +4.40  +5,71  -5.15  -0.40  *  0.00  -3.93  -0.27
Transiter's  Profit  IT  + 1.12  +0.48  +0.71  +3.33  +4.48  -3.00  -0.30  -0.12  -3.00  0.00
Revenue  w  . 23.4%  0.00  -0.43  +0.08  +0.35  +0.35  -0.54  +0.19  0.00  -0.54  0.00
Transiter'.
Share  in  Unit  Rent  wit  0.00  -0.25  -0.05  -0.26  -0.26  +0.23  +0.02  0.00  +0.23  0.00
Total Profit  wll.  0.07  -0.32  -0.11  -0.50  4-.56  + 1.08  +0.05  -0.06  +0.47  +0.13Grais  & Zheng  Strategic  Interdependence  in the East-West  Gas Trade
V.  Conclusions
The current and potential  benefits  of  would  face rising  costs of gas imports  and loose
the East West gas trade are enormous  for all  wclfare.
participants. The realization  of these benefits
require significant  upfront investments. The  An increase  in the scope  of substitution
new, and  more  complex, structure  of the gas  for the importer  between gas from alternative
transit  system  that has emerged following  the  sources  improves  on welfare  of all three  players.
changes in  Eastern Europe and the  Former  The perception  oni  the part of the supplier  and
Soviet  Union  has created  uncertainties  however  transiter of an enhanced  threat of competition
that  bear on  the  expected benefits of  the  leads  to a preemptive  move  to not loose  market
investments.  This  paper  argues  for the existence  share.  The transiter and supplier reduce the
of  stable contracts  that  would  create  an  transit  fee  and  supply  price  respectively  allowing
environment  more  conducive  to the investnents  the importer to face a  lower gas price.  The
and allow all participants  to benefit from the  latter's import demand expands and welfare
expansion  of the gas trade. A framework  based  improve.  The expanded trade  more  than
on a Stackelberg  game with three players (a  compensates  for the reduction  in the transit fee
supplier, a  transiter and an importer) under  and supply  price and allows  for larger  pay-offs
Russia's  leadership  is proposed  as a guide  to the  for the transiter  and supplier.
formulation  of incentive  compatible,  transparent
and flexible  contracts. The framework  is used  The perception  of increased  reliability  of
to analyze  the contract  modifications  that would  supplies  of gas from Russia  shifts outward  the
ensue  from changes  in the enviroment bearing  demand  for gas from Russia and leads to the
on the gas  trade. Three  main conclusions  can be  expansion  of trade.  The supplier and transiter
drawn.  have  scope  to raise  their respective  charges  with
expanded volumes improving their pay-offs.
An  increased competitiveless of  the  The importer's  welfare  deteriorates  as the cost  of
transiter and supplier through cost reductions  importing gas rises.
would  improve  the pay-offs  of all players  in the
game. The transiter's and supplier's profits as  The  predictability of  the  players'
well as the western importer's welfare  would  reactions  to changes  in the environment  would
improve. Basically  it would induce  a strategic  build confidence  in the reliability  of gas trade
behavior  on the part of the supplier  and transiter  and  allow  its  expansion  benefitfing  all
that would  lead  to a decline  in the price  faced  by  participants. The game proposed  in the paper
the importer,  enlarging  gas demand  and  reducing  provides  a framework  for analyzing  the strategic
costs.  If the increased  competitiveness  is the  moves of the players and gaining insights  on
outcome  of more costly  gas from other sources  their predictability.
than Russia,  both the supplier's and transiter's
pay-offs would improve but  the  importer's
welfare would deteriorate.  The supplier and
transiter  would  have  leeway  to strategically  raise
their price and transit fee respectively  while
gaining  market share.  The importer  however
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Notes:
1.  An additional amount of about 30 bcm could be supplied with limited investments  in
the order of $325 million.  Expansion  of supplies by additional 60 bcm could be made
with further investments  at still a reasonable  rate of retum.  Beyond these amounts
transport costs rise significandy. Moreover, energy efficiency improvement in Russia
through structural adjustment  and appropriate energy pricing policies can also be
expected to contribute  to energy conservation in the domiestic  market and thus
generate additional exportable gas.
2.  In addition each transit country has its own privatization and coxporatization
objectives that bear on the fate of the companies  managing the transit services  and the
commercial  policies these would follow.
3-  All of these policies seem to be pursued by Gazprom.  For instance, in the fall of
1990 Gazprom  joined Wintershall/BASF  in a new partnership.
4.  Considering  individual countries as idependent  players can be done at some cost but
would not add insights.
5.  From (1) we have
aP  0  e  a=-o,  - =  c0e
afa  eD  aT  eD  OtR  6 D  ijDn  -C
6.  In fact one would take the utility funcdon of a  epresentative  consumer and the size of
the populaton.  Here we abstract from that to simplify the presentation  without loss
of generality.
7.  The first order condition for the transit revenue ma  on  can be written as
MxR'= & =CT-  S)(-  a)_  MCT
8.  The first order condition for Russia's gas exports can be wrten  as
AMRR = GG  =  +RC(aG  aT PR
C)  aGYa  -a;  -=  MC"I
9.  Cooperation  here is understood  in the game theory terminology, i.e.  sharing of
information, of resources and pay-offs.  Players would cooperate if they ex ante agree
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to share. The recent joint venture between Gazprom and BASF/Wintershall is a
cooperative feature, however it does not necessarily allow the latter to have full
access to the information environment of Gazprom.
10.  The annex specifies the welfare index and derives the demand equation. The CES
form incorporates the assumption of strong separability between the demand for gas
from alternative sources and the demand of other commodities.  The elasticity of
substitution between the sources of gas is independent of relative price changes of
other goods.
11.  One can calculate, in the reighborhood of the initial equilibrium, possible outcomes of
the game generated from different price reactions from the supplier and the transiter.
For instance, when Y increases by one percent, a one percent increase in the price of
Russian gas would  lead to about 5 % loss in the sales volume and about 3 % loss in
the sales revenue, instead of any financial gains from the price hike.
12.  Basically  profits are not homogeneous of degree one with respect to demand, or
alternatively the marginal profit is larger han the average.  More specifically, one
can derive that
AHR/  Pj-C  R  >  1  anld  IHR <.  T-S  >
AGIG  P-C-FR  AGIG  Fr
G
for FR  > 0, and FT>  0.
I3.  -No  benefits from arbitrage are assumed here as the model is calibrated in US dollars,
to be coherent with our classification  of players into groups.  The exchange rate
parity holds here, e.g.,  DMI$ =  (K/$)/(KIDM).
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This  annex specifies the hierarchical  goods and  services consumed, in  order  to
Stackelberg  game  as established  in the main  text  capture  both income  and substitution  effects  due
of the paper.  An equilibrium  is attained  when  to  the  price  fluctuations  and other extemal
no player has any incentive  to furither  its own  perturbations.  We  derive the  gas demand
interest by  unilaterally changing its strategy  function,  which  serves  as the importer's  strategy
selection, given  other  players'  behavioral  selection rule in  response to  other players'
choices. The equilibrium  outcome  of the game  strategy choices,  and calculate  the (indirect)
is characterized  by individual  rationale  in terms  social  welfare  index  at  the  equilibrium
that  each  player  has maximized  its own  payoff  in  neighborhood. For presentational  simplicity,
an environment  of strategic  interdependence,  and  we concentrate on the sub-branch  containing
by collective  coherence  in terms  that  each  player  only  the imported  gas  from two  different  foreign
views  the equilibrium  outcome  as acceptable  and  sources, Russia and  the  other  area.  The
better  than any results  otherwise.  assumption  on an MLN-CES utility finction
helps  conceptalize  complementariness  and
The mathematical  structure  of the game  substitution  linkages  between  energy
is presented  here in three steps.  First,  the  consumption  and consumption  of other  goods at
players'  decision  problems  are  analyzed  first, and then inter-thel  substitutions  within  the
sequentially.  This  interactive optimization  energy  bundle. The important  point here is  tat
procedure  guarantees  the Pareto  optimality  of the  price changes  of non-foreign  gas are translated
equilibrium  outcome  of the game. Second,  the  across the branches  in the utility tree into an
behavioral  consistency  of strategy choices is  income  change  for decisions  on gas importing.
checked  to attain the Stackelberg  equilibrium  Hence,  the expenditure  on importing  foreign  gas
solution of  this  hierarchical game.  Six  can rise not only when the overall national
endogenous  variables,  - the gas supply  price,  income increases, but also the relative prices
the transit fee, and the import volume in fIt  move in directions  favorable  to consumption  of
strategy  bundle,  and the gas supply  profit, the  imported  gas.  Meanwhile,  a rise in foreign  gas
gas transit  profit, and  the resultant  social  welfare  prices will induce reallocation  of money for
level of the importing country in thLe ff  increasing  consumption  of other  goods, and  will
bundle, - are explicitly  linked to  exogenous  reshape  the market  shares  of gas imported  from
variables, including the importer's aggregate  different  sources. Specifically,  we assume
expenditure  on  gas,  availability  and
substitutability  of altenative gas supplies  in the
importer's market, the gas production cost, the  U  =  CES(G,  0  a,  a]
gas transit cost,  and the  prevailing exchange  t  1  !  . (1)
rates.  Finally, parameters in the game are  _ (s  -i
calibrated  using  relevant  statistics  best available.
A.  The Importeres  Decision  where
U  the  utility  level  geneated  from
The importer  maximizes  its utility on  consumption  of foreign  gas
behalf of final gas consumers  in the Western  G  consumption  of Russian  gas,
European  market,  subject  to  its  budget  0  a composite  commodity,  composed  of
constraint  We choose  a utility function  with a  gas from all other sources,
structure  of  multi-level  nested  constnt  a  Russia's share  at the bencha  case,
elasticities  of substitutions  (MLN-CES)  bdween  a  subsdtution  elasticity  between  G and 0.
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Given  prices  Pfor  G and  PO  for 0,  the
following  budget  constraint  applies,  GY  =1  (7)
PoG  + POOCY  ('2)
The price elasticity  of demand  is
where Y is the total income  allocated  for gas
consumption.  Maximizing  the utility in  (1)  P0 mG
subject to  the constraint in (2) leads to  the  =,  GP(
following  expenditure  function
1  (3)P/J  (uy  tPG
E(PG,P-  u)[pl-s+(l  }Pl-vl"  r  (  X\  I  Po)  Y
and the indirect  utility  function  This is the Slutsky equation, in which
(,4)  the first term on the right hand side represents
(4) 1  \}income effect  and the second  term  represents  the
V(PcsPc,Y)  = [Pc  +(j-M)Po ]  Y  substitution  effect  due own price changes. As
expected,  a larger or  or a will generate  a larger
Fubstitution effect  in gas demand.
The demand  function  for Russian  gas is
then
r  I-  rC  (P  l  r  5)3  - -B.  The Transites  Decision
G(P 0 P0 pY)=  a  (P  |  Thetransiter  maximizes  its  transkprofit
a  }  G  wbychoosing  a unit transit fee,  T, for  each given
supply  price set by the gas supplier  and takng
which exhibits homogeneity  of degree one in  into consideration  market reactions from the
prices  and income. The share  of expenditure  on  importer's  side. Namely,
Russian  gas is
Mar  U  IL  = (T-S)G  - FT  (9)
P0 G  |j~  +  (1  (.l  PG)]  (6)
°I  where S is the  unit  transit cost,  and FT is the
fixed cost for the gas transit systemn.  For any
Hence,  if the competition  in the German  given Russian gas supply price, P.,  the unit
market  of foreign  gas initially  equalizes  P0 and  transit  fee can be expressed  as
P., then  ac  will be the share  for Russian  gas. In
the case o=-1,  i.e.,  a  Cobb-Douglas  utility  T  =  ceP 0 -RPR  (AD)
function  for the gas importer,  the market share
will not change  with the reladve  price and thus  where eD and eR are exchange rates of the
remain constant, though the demand quantity  transiter's local currency against that of the
will decline when its own price rises.  The  importer  and supplier, respectively. The first
income  elasticity  of demand  is  order  condition  for the profit maximizaon is
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profit-marginal  cost  ratio; and  (c)  the transiter's
-( _T-S--  i;a  (I1)  current  profitabflity  reflected  from  the  pric-cost
aP 0 8ar  ratio. If thi transiter  foresees  that a big decline
in gas demand  may  occur  due  to a price  rise, It
The transiter equalizes  the  marginal  may  be willing  to reduce  its transit fee  to rotain
revenue and the marginal cost of raising its  the quantity  at the level which maximizes  its
transit  fee.  When  the supply  price is fixed, a  transit  profit.
higher  transit  fee is passed  through  to a higher
import  price, which  depresses  the demand  for
gas.  Ihis  first  order  condition can  be  C.  The Supplier's  Decision
rearranged  into
Knowing  how  both the importer  and  the
- T-S  T(dOG p0 v ai'o T  1'  transiter adjust their strategies, the gas supplier
-r  G  p 0lJ  (12)  as the Stackelberg  leader detennines  a supply
apR  a  price,  PR, to maximize  its profit. That is
This  clearly  states  tiatthe  mark-up  ratio  Max II  - (P`x)G  - Fx  (15)
of the transiter  is determined  as the inverse  of  p
the product  of the price elasticity  of gas demand
and  the elasticity  of the gas price  with  respect  to  where  C is the  unit production  cost and  F, is the
the transit  fee.  The transiter's  optimal  reaction  fixed  supply  cost. The first order  condition  is
function  is thus implicitly  defined  by:  ap
T S=ST  a  |_]  - +1  alpx  aT ap)
e,P,+S  ei[i-4  e4) 
where  the reaction  of T with respect  to change
The left hand is the transiter's  ratio of  of P 1 is determined  through  the transiter's  best
marginal  profit and marginal  cost, an index  of  reaction  fiuntion  (10). This first  order  condition
the transiter's negotiation  power.  The right  can be rewritten  as
hand side is the market condition  in terms of
relative prices, expenditure  shares and the  aG  dPG  dP  T
adjustments  with respect to  changes in  the  PR-C.  Pc;
supply  price  can be thus  derived  as  P5 aP0 aP 1 AT aPx
OT  eRfT+e,P 5 T+eP,  'Po  p.  P, aT  = ex  +eRP+t  +  PR  1 (14)
aPp  a [ CeP 1,+S  T-S  J
Hence, the profit margin of the gas
supplier  is determined  through  both direct  and
Hence,  whether  the transiter  follows  the  indirect  effects  of price changes. Raising  the
supplier's  price  movement  depends  crucially  on  supply  price will not only push  up direcdy  the
(a) the market reactions reflected from the  final sales price in the importing  country,  but
elasticity of  substitution,  (b) the  transiter's  also  provoke  the  transiter  tooptinally adjust  its
negotiation  power reflected  from the marginal  transit fee  setting.  The decision rule  is
iii
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imbedded  in the following  implicit function,  and transiter's  share in the total revenue.
1t  + ar) B.  Calibration  of the Parameters
e  7  1  1 +11  Eight  parameters  in  the  game  model
T+eRC (P,C)-p  /-a  o  need to  be determined to calibrate our bench
op,  mark case.
=  T  - S  (1)  Expenditure on gas , Y:  About 25% of
etPe+S  gas consumption  in the Western  Europe  comes
(18)  from Russia,  which was 60 b'lion  cubic meters
valued at  $9 billion  in  1992.  Hence,  the total
Substituting  the  transiter's  optimal  gas  consumption  should  be  240  billion  cubic
reaction into the above equation,  we have  meters.  The suppliers  and transiters  in the East-
West  gas  trade  shared  57%  of  the  total  sales
S+CePRt  - S  TTe  C  1  =  revenue,  i.e.  $5.16  billion  in  1992.  Assuming
T+ e,PR  PR-C  T+exP,t eA  that  gas from  other  sources  are equally  costly,
(19)  we get Y  =  $20.52 billion.
-T+e  PR  T+exPR
a  ejtPtPR+S  T-S  (2)  Price of Gas from Other Sources, PO:
The  gas from Russia was priced  on the German
board  at  $86 per thousand cubic meters in 1992
D.  The Stackewberg Equilibrium  Solution  ($5.16 billionl60  bcm).  We take this  as a price
proxy for gas from other sources.  Hence, PO-=
An  equilibrium  in  this  game  can  be  $861tcm.  This leads to et =  25.
defined  as  a  strategy  profile  (PR'  ,  Gs), 
where  the superscript  S indicates a Stackelberg  (3)  The  fixed  gas  transit  cost  F7 and  the
solution-,  which  satisfies  the  following  fixed gas supply  cost  FR  do not affect players'
sequential optimization  procedure:  decisions.  However, they affect the distribution
of the total profit.  Our best rough estimates for
(1)  IR  (PSR,  v,  GS) :  I'  (TR,  r,  ) and  theseanmulizedfixedcostsareFT  =$100  million
P1, >  C, for  (1',  G)  as determined  in  and F,  =$200  million,  respectively.
(li) and (M);
(il)  For  any  given  PR.  ,  EuP,,  Ti,  G0) >  (4)  The  variable  gas  transit  cost  S  is
IW(P,,,  T,  GS) and  V6>S,  for  Ge  as  estimated  to  be  $5.  Russia's  supply  cost  C,
determined in (I);  and  including the transit cost to the Ukrainian board,
(m)  For any given PR. and G,  CES(GS"O; a,  is estimated to be $50.
a)  2-  CES(G,O; au,)  and the budget
constraint (2) is not violated.  (5)  Since we calibrate  in US dollars, both e%
and e1 are artificially  set to be unit.
Accordingly,  the equilibrium  payoffs in
terms of the gas supply profit,  the gas transit  (6)  We seectsa . >  1to  make the solution
profit, and the importer's welfare index can be  of the game as close as possible  to our observed
derived.  Meanwhile, one  can calculate the  outcome: G  =60  bcn,  P0 =  $86/tcn.
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